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Tasked with outlining the stages of Plato’s famous cave story, arguing for their certain significance, and then giving consideration to my argument’s strengths and weaknesses in acquiring philosophical knowledge, the end result is the following essay. It forms part of the course work for the 2nd/3rd year philosophy subject Plato, Nietzsche, and the Meaning of Being at La Trobe University.

In Plato’s story of the cave we may understand the released prisoner’s/philosopher’s journey as a process of liberation whereby knowledge of the truth is attained. More specifically, and keeping in mind knowledge of the truth as a mindset to which the released prisoner aspires, we may understand the cave story by utilising, and then unpacking the meanings of, two particular Greek words – lēthē and aletheia. Lēthē may be translated as ‘forgetfulness’, while aletheia, containing the negation prefix of ‘a–’, can be understood as the converse – ‘not forgetting’. Here, the opposing matters of ‘forgetfulness’ and ‘not forgetting’ can also be considered as opposing matters of ignorance and recognition coupled with acceptance insofar as what the cave story represents: two different mindsets and parts of the world – one outside the cave, where an immense diversity of life forms and ways of being are manifest; and the cave itself, where an ignorant and indoctrinated mindset reigns, denying recognition and acceptance of the world beyond. It is then the contention of this essay that Plato’s cave story can be interpreted as one about the truth of difference and that it is possible to know or realise its acceptance. I must make explicit here that my intention in emphasising openness to and embracing of difference is a gesture towards equality; that is, the difference found outside the cave may be considered as a symbol of that which we hope would be accepted in aspiring to reach political, social or, where it is apt, economic equality, whether it is between ethnicities, genders, sexualities, or the human and animal or environmental, and so forth. In offering this interpretation I will begin by outlining the stages of the cave story, and then graduate to unpacking the significance of each stage. Further, I will consider the strengths and weaknesses of the interpretation insofar as acquiring philosophical knowledge as they arise within the discussion.

Like Heidegger (1998), I propose a four-stage outline of the process. However, where Heidegger emphasises stages of truth only, I would like to emphasise stages of truth and knowledge of difference, presenting them as follows: 1) indoctrination; 2) transition; 3) acceptance; 4) return. Stage one positions us purely inside the cave: its structure contains the prisoners, who are shrouded mostly in darkness, held in chains, and forced to see only what is immediate – shadows. These are cast by a fire burning behind the prisoners and by puppeteers holding objects in-between. Yet, the cave has an opening/exit, albeit one that is further behind the prisoners. Stage two straddles both the inside and outside of the cave: one prisoner is released from their chains, and he/she then turns around, notices the objects themselves and the fire, and starts on the painful passage towards the cave’s opening/exit and towards the light. Now outside the cave and under the light of the sun, the released prisoner experiences immense variety in not only the shadows of different things but in new differences also: reflections, things themselves in nature, stars, the moon, the heavens, the sun, and infinite horizons. In stage three the released prisoner, now fully immersed in the differences outside the cave, realises all that he/she has experienced, and then opens his/herself up to embrace it. Following this, the released prisoner sets upon stage four: choosing to return to the cave where he/she risks intense ridicule or death. Yet, the cave, at its exit, remains open.

Turning towards each stage’s significance now, we firstly examine stage one: indoctrination. Considering this initial stage in terms of indoctrination – that is, the cave as a collective of mindsets coerced into subscribing to one doctrine, and as such are ignorant – its details provide us with a number of symbols suggesting such indoctrination. For instance, the cave’s environment can be read as being incredibly oppressive: its structure – the solid subterranean earth – encloses those inside in a space of near-darkness (the fire providing only a certain amount of light). Not only would such a structure seem impenetrable to the flesh, but, coupled with the darkness, it also has those it contains closed off or hidden, rather, from what is beyond the cave. Next, there are those being held – the prisoners, who are the subjects of ignorance and indoctrination, a fact magnified by them being restrained by chains, further solidifying the theme of coercion. Further is the significance of sight and sound: Plato never mentions the prisoners’ other faculties such as smell, taste, or touch. Here, the prisoners are in a state of diminished faculties, so not only is their environment oppressing them but also their capacities to sense and perceive are greatly reduced. Then there is what the prisoners can only see – shadows, whose darkness, recalling the environmental darkness above, acts as a further symbol of oppression. The last point of significance here is the cave’s opening/exit, whose importance lies in there being no mention of a door that may seal it off. This suggests that without such an obstruction, the cave is endowed with the quality of being eternally open to the world beyond itself. (The fullest significance of this eternal opening/exit will become apparent at the end of the stage four). This initial stage contains the prisoners in such a way that is almost impossible for them to experience any kind of difference. As such, it is the essence of lēthē.

We can now consider stage two: transition. Confronted with release, the prisoner’s first move of turning around is critical insofar as it signalling a symbolic reverse: now facing the opposite direction, the prisoner has turned away from what must be reversed for recognising and accepting difference to occur – that is, chains and shadows of oppression. In noticing the objects and fire that caused the shadows, and having not perceived them before, the prisoner witnesses here a sense of difference for the first time. We may take from this occurrence that a degree of difference, albeit one unrecognised hitherto, does exist within the cave. Next comes the pain of moving beyond the fire and towards the cave’s opening/exit. This may be read as the prisoner approaching what Heidegger (1998, p. 168) referred to as “unhidding”. This being a symbolic action of the wresting away of a veil – that is, one of ignorance and indoctrination ­– which, in itself, implies a sense of violence and subsequent pain. Additionally, as the prisoner gets closer to the opening/exit, the light would grow larger in his/her eyes, suggesting the gradual nearing of the opposite of oppressive darkness. Once leaving the cave, the prisoner’s experience of immense variety is one of radical difference; that is, an almost unimaginable difference completely opposed to the cave. Not only is there light and openness where there was darkness and confinement, but also there are colours, scents, tastes, textures, and life forces that one would have previously thought inconceivable.

Before moving to stage three, I must acknowledge what I consider a strength of this interpretation’s approach insofar as acquiring philosophical knowledge. This involves the prisoner only being able to recognise with certainty the radical difference before him/her rather than a higher form of knowledge.  To arrive here, we must consider the world outside the cave in terms of external world skepticism, particularly the brain-in-a-vat scenario (BIV).  This being that any knowledge claims about the external world may be undermined by the hypothesis that we really exist as BIVs, programmed to believe we are living in a world that is actually a grand illusion (The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 2008). Here, we are presented with a knowledge problem: either the external world is A) an illusion, or B) it actually exists. Yet, if we cannot know A, since our sense perception suggests existence, it follows that we cannot know B, since we cannot seem to prove that the external world is not an illusion. Given this uncertainty, the released prisoner could not truly make the ascent to enlightenment as Socrates claims (Republic 517b). What remains, however, is the palpably radical difference of the world outside the cave, and whether its appearance is illusory or not – insofar as the BIV is concerned – we may reason that its difference from the cave still remains, and that its difference is certain.

Coupled with this certainty of difference and its immensity that fills the prisoner, he/she is taken beyond and into stage three: acceptance. Plato (Republic 516c) posits that the prisoner’s experience places him/her in a state of happiness. We may take from this that instead of the radically different experience destroying him/her, the prisoner sustains – going beyond mere tolerance of difference and to a state of contentedness. The prisoner, in other words, has accepted radical difference. Furthermore, this is the point where the prisoner completely ceases to be a prisoner; that is, having been filled with the immensity of radical difference, and having adjusted to what one has experienced outside the cave, the prisoner has now completely transcended ignorance and indoctrination, becoming the essence of its converse – aletheia.

What remains is the significance of stage four: return. Here, Plato makes no reference to the return being motivated. Yet, it is possible that the philosopher, having encountered difference that is the opposite of the cave, has a moment of being impelled to reflect upon it and to challenge the cave’s mindset by offering difference, thus returning. However, the philosopher returning as an embodiment of difference is unsuccessful. From this, we may be tempted to consider it a weakness that the philosopher failed in challenging the cave mindset, signalling a failure to impart the knowledge of difference. Yet, we need not view it this way, for the cave itself contains aspects that could make transformation for other prisoners a reality.

There are three possible aspects to consider here: firstly, and initially, the released prisoner may be regarded as lacking a distinct identity, making him/her relatively anonymous among the other prisoners. We may draw from this that such anonymity affords the prisoner a kind of ‘anyone’ status and, further, that the subsequent journey towards accepting difference may be a possibility for any of the prisoners. Secondly, and partnering with prisoner anonymity, is the seemingly spontaneous and indiscriminate occurrence of the prisoner’s release. As it lacks any explicit hint towards supernatural or human intervention, we are only left with the event’s indiscriminate nature, thus providing us with a further relation to anonymity. Lastly, there is the cave’s opening/exit that remains eternally open. What we have here is not just an eternal gateway towards a world beyond the cave but a symbolic suggestion that such a passage is eternally on offer to the prisoners. This opening/exit being part of the very makeup of the cave structure – one that is, in itself, highly oppressive – suggests that, if the cave is to be understood as the essence of lēthē, an everlasting sense of liberation is part of the cave’s inherent character. From this standpoint, we may now consider some of cave’s conditions as a strength of approach since there are catalysts beyond the philosopher’s attempt that could make imparting knowledge of difference possible.

However, this raises two counterpoints that take us back towards implications of weakness: Firstly, if other prisoners were to be released, it seems uncertain as to whether they would have the capacity to sustain radical difference, thus raising the possibility of a retreat to ignorance. Anonymity here may work against us, for it is ambiguous, insofar as Plato’s presentation of the story, as to whether the released prisoner was exceptional – being more able to accept difference – or not before release.  Secondly, it also seems uncertain as to whether other prisoners would actually find release despite the fact that its catalysts are available – perhaps the prisoner’s release was a ‘one off’. By these accounts, attaining knowledge of difference would be difficult to achieve.

As I have argued, Plato’s cave story can be read as one about the truth of difference existing and that it is possible for such difference to not only be tolerated but to be embraced by one – who then becomes the essence of aletheia – who once found him/herself in a state of complete ignorance and indoctrination, or lēthē. Yet, some of the conditions by which the prisoner attains knowledge of the truth – ambiguities which can work both for and against this essay’s aim – may not necessarily translate to imparting the knowledge of difference to others who are ignorant and indoctrinated. From here, we can ultimately draw from the story of the cave a true sense of the state of affairs regarding political, social, and economic equalities and inequalities in the world; that is, there are some who actively aspire towards the realm(s) of equality, some who are close to such aspirations, and some who are more difficult to reach, and so on. Yet, if the inherent opening/exit from ignorance to acceptance exists within us all, then at the very least we can remain hopeful that those who are more difficult to reach can someday aspire.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Heidegger, M. 1998, “Plato’s doctrine of truth”, trans. T. Sheehan, in W. McNeill (ed.), Pathmarks, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 155-182.

Plato 2012, Republic, trans. C. Rowe, Penguin Publishing, London.